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THE AFTERMATH OF FESTO V. SMC: IS THERE "SOME OTHER




The importance of technological innovation is one of the driving
forces behind the U.S. patent system. 1 The patent laws encourage this in-
novation and create an incentive to invent by granting a time-limited right
to exclude to those inventors who fulfill the requirements for patent protec-
tion. 2 Generally, in exchange for public disclosure of the invention, a patent
grants the patentee the right to prevent others from making, using, selling,
or offering to sell the patented invention in the United States or from im-
porting it into the United States for a term of twenty years from the date a
patent application was filed.3 Under the U.S. patent system, the lure of
obtaining a monopoly on a commercially profitable invention induces re-
search, development, and, ultimately, progress in the form of new technol-
ogy.4 In theory, because inventors would be unable to recoup the time,
money, and resources they invested in discovering and developing the in-
vention, invention and technical innovation would come to a halt without
the benefit of this limited monopoly.
5
* J.D. and Certificate in Intellectual Property candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.S.E. Biomedical Engineering, curn laude, June 2004, Univer-
sity of Michigan. Erin Conway is an Executive Articles Editor for the Chicago-Kent Law Review. The
author would like to thank her advisor Professor Elizabeth De Armond for her countless hours of help
in reviewing and revising this Note and Professor Timothy Holbrook for sparking her interest in this
topic.
1. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(l)-(2) (2000); see also id. § 27 1(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent."). The term of the patent begins on the date that the patent issues and ends
twenty years from the date that the patent application was filed in the United States. Id. § 154(a)(2).
4. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
5. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 994 (1997) ("In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation
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However, in order to promote such technological progress and create
an incentive to invent, the patent system must enable efficient investment. 6
Inventors will be less likely to invest their time and money in creation and
invention without the confidence that a patent will effectively protect their
right to exclude and, thus, their ability to recoup their initial investment. 7
Conversely, competing inventors will be less likely to invest if they are
unsure that their work does not overlap with the patented invention or de-
vice of another.8 While the difference between these two statements seems
subtle, they reflect two very important functions of the patent system: the
protective function and the notice function.
The notice function mandates that, in exchange for the limited mo-
nopoly of a patent, inventors must disclose their inventions to the public in
"full, clear, concise, and exact terms."9 Patents notify the public of what
subject matter is not claimed and therefore provide guideposts to subse-
quent improvers as to what will and will not infringe. 10 By announcing to
the public what he owns and what he does not, the patentee has notified the
public as to which areas are open for innovation.II The protective function
of a patent is embodied in the right to exclude others from the market of the
patented invention.1 2 This constitutional mandate simply codifies the idea
that, before an inventor will feel comfortable presenting her invention to
the public in exchange for the monopoly of a patent, she must be assured
that a patent will adequately protect her from potential infringers. 13
unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so-that is, unless they can reasona-
bly expect to make a profit from the endeavor.").
6. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722, 730-31
(2002).
7. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 994.
8. See generally id. at 994-1000; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 150 (1989) ("[T]he purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and
exploitation of either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily dis-
cerned from publicly available material.").
9. The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides that
[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of car-
rying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
10. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). A patentee must define claims with specific-
ity "not only to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to
them." Id.
11. Id.
12. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852).
13. See id. The other option for inventors is to maintain their inventions as trade secrets. This does
not require the extensive public disclosure of the invention that is required by the patent system.
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In 2002, the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co. ("Festo VIII") acknowledged the necessity of protecting a
patentee's rights while still providing notice to the public of what is cov-
ered by the patent. 14 Keeping these ideals in mind, the Court nobly set out
to clarify the scope of two important, yet troublesome doctrines of the pat-
ent laws-the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution' 5 history estoppel.
Unfortunately, the Court's decision did not alleviate much of the tension
between these two doctrines and may have even exacerbated the problem.
In its attempt to restore balance between the protective and notice func-
tions, the Court created a new presumption for determining when the doc-
trine of equivalents would apply and when prosecution history estoppel
would bar its use. The Court defined three possible methods for patentees
to rebut its new presumption, the third of which will be the focus of this
Note.
This Note will argue that the third rebuttal criterion set out in Festo
VIII greatly diminishes the notice function of patents by elevating the doc-
trine of equivalents above prosecution history estoppel and greatly favoring
protecting patentees over providing notice to the public. Part I of this Note
first details the general state of the law with respect to the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel, without discussing those
changes made by the Festo line of cases. Part II outlines the relevant pro-
cedural history of the Festo line of cases and provides significant detail to
the Festo VI, VIII, and IX cases. Lastly, Part III contends that the Supreme
Court should limit the third rebuttal criterion to those situations where the
shortcomings of language prevented the patentee from adequately describ-
ing the equivalent in question. To realize this conclusion, Part III will ana-
lyze how the Supreme Court chose and justified the three rebuttal criteria
and how cases since Festo VIII have interpreted and applied the third rebut-
tal criterion. This suggestion also is premised on the notion that the protec-
tive and notice functions of patent law can only be preserved by limiting
the third rebuttal criterion in this way.
14. 535 U.S. 722, 737-40 (2002) (reversing the Federal Circuit's decision to adopt a complete bar
rule, which prevented the patentee from claiming equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents when
prosecution history estoppel applied, and instead, adopting a new rebuttable presumption rule).
15. The process of drafting the patent application is called "preparation," and the subsequent paper
exchange with the Patent and Trademark Office including filing the application is called "prosecution."
From the practitioner's perspective, the entire application process is called, colloquially, "prep and
pros." STEVEN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 1: 1 (15th ed. 2006).
2007]
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL
The claims 16 of a patent define the scope of the patent owner's right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
the protected invention. 17 For this reason, the language of the claims is
scrutinized intensely in analyzing both the validity of the patent and
whether it has been infringed.18 Limiting the scope of a patent to the literal
language of the claims helps to preserve the notice function of the patent
laws by clearly announcing to the public the boundaries of the protected
subject matter.
However, describing an invention through the use of mere words can
be a taxing request. 19 Because language is naturally ambiguous, and be-
cause a patentable invention is, by definition, something that does not al-
ready exist in the art, there are times when language cannot capture the
essence of an invention. 20 This imperfect fit might allow a pirating copyist
16. An applicant for a patent must include in the specification accompanying the application for
the patent "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000). Patent claims define the inven-
tion for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability, i.e., eligible subject matter, originality,
novelty, utility, and non-obviousness; the statutory bars; and the disclosure requirements. The claims
also define the invention for the purpose of determining infringement, i.e., what constitutes the process
or thing that may not be made, used, or sold in the United States without the permission of the patent
owner. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
Supreme Court has likened patent claims to the description of real property in a deed "which sets the
bounds to the grant which it contains." Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 510 (1917).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall contain.., a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States .... ").
18. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 ("An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is deter-
mining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. The second step is compar-
ing the properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing. It is the first step, commonly
known as claim construction or interpretation, that is at issue in this appeal." (citations and footnotes
omitted)).
19. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). This is especially
true if it is a pioneering invention. See Brief of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-
United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722 (No. 00-1543), 2001 WL
1025309 [hereinafter Brief of IEEE] ("A pioneering invention can be defined as something that per-
forms a function never before performed-'a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and impor-
tance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art.. . .' By comparison, technological
improvements are useful, though often minor, advances over the previously existing technology."
(citation omitted)). As one can imagine, the more novel the invention, the more likely it is that the
inventor will have difficulty adequately describing it in words.
20. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 731 ("The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance
of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty."); see also Matthew J.
Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1045, 1057 (2001) ("Because the language of claims can never perfectly describe an inven-
tion or anticipate all the ways in which it might be modified, effective patent protection often requires
claims to be read more broadly than their literal language would permit." (footnote omitted)).
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to make some insubstantial change to the patented invention in order to
escape the literal wording of the claims, while still maintaining its spirit
and essential functions.21 Therefore, effective patent protection often re-
quires claims to be read more broadly than their literal language would
permit. 22 Yet, by allowing a court to expand the scope of the patent beyond
what lies on the face of the claims, the patent document itself may not put
the public on notice of what is still in the public domain. All of these con-
cerns lie at the heart of the conflict between the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel.
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents
While it is important to remember that a patent represents a property
right "and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear,' '23 re-
stricting the patent to the subject matter literally contained within the
claims can turn a patent into "a hollow and useless thing. '24 A patent
would provide little protection to the patentee if the patent laws allowed an
accused infringer to avoid infringement by making insubstantial changes to
the patented invention or by using the ambiguity of language to avoid the
literal scope of the claims.25 For these reasons, while never actually calling
it by name, the Supreme Court in Winans v. Denmead adopted the doctrine
of equivalents in 1853 to preserve the protective function of patents.2
6
Unlike literal infringement, which requires that the accused product or
process come completely within the terms of an asserted patent claim, 27
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents does not put the patentee at
the "mercy of verbalism. '28 This doctrine recognizes that, in order to ade-
quately protect a patentee, a court may sometimes extend the scope of the
21. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
22. See id. (recognizing that holding a patentee to the literal language of the claims would provide
for an inequitable result-allowing others to essentially copy the patentee's invention by incorporating
only insubstantial changes).
23. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 730.
24. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; see also Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 731.
25. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342-43 (1853). "[T]he property of inventors
would be valueless, if it were enough for the defendant to say, your improvement consisted in a change
of form; you describe and claim but one form; I have not taken that, and so have not infringed." Id. The
exclusive right conveyed in the patent would be useless if it did not protect the patentee from such
"fraud on the patent." Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
26. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343.
27. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Literal in-
fringement requires that the accused device contain each limitation of the claim exactly; any deviation
from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.").
28. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
2007]
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patentee's right to exclude beyond the literal boundaries of the claim.29 The
Court in Winans recognized that while one purpose of the patent laws is to
encourage innovation, creation, and the pursuit of "new ideas beyond the
inventor's exclusive rights," 30 another is to protect the proprietary interest
of the inventor.31 Thus, under the doctrine of equivalents, the scope of a
patent is not limited to what lies on its face, but instead embraces all
equivalents to the claims described therein.
32
Equitable in nature, the doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused in-
fringer from avoiding liability for infringement by making trivial altera-
tions or changes to the patented invention while still retaining the spirit of
the invention. 33 While these changes would take the accused infringer out-
side of the literal scope of the patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents
allows the patentee to claim these insubstantial alterations that are not
found within the claim language. 34 If the patentee were precluded from
asserting those equivalents, the accused infringer could steal the benefit of
a patented invention without incurring the initial costs borne by the pat-
entee. 35
29. The Court in Winans v. Denmead expressed that merely "changing of form" of an invention
already known to the public is not deserving of a patent. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 330. However, if such a
change of form were to bring about a "new mode of operation, and thus attain a new and useful result,"
then it would be worthy of patent protection. Id. In order to preserve these principles, the Court felt that
a patent should grant the inventor protection over all forms of his invention which effectuate the result
claimed in the patent:
It is generally true, when a patentee describes a machine, and then claims it as described,
that he is understood to intend to claim, and does by law actually cover, not only the precise
forms he has described, but all other forms which embody his invention; it being a familiar
rule that, to copy the principle or mode of operation described, is an infringement, although
such copy should be totally unlike the original in form or proportions
It is not sufficient to distinguish this case to say, that here the invention consists in a
change of form, and the patentee has claimed one form only.
Id. at 342.
30. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
(citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)).
31. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343. In Winans, the Court held that a person "has no right
whatever to take ... a leaf out of his neighbor's book," id. at 334, and simply make "substantial copies
of [a patented invention], varying its form or proportions" without falling subject to infringement. Id. at
343. The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially recognized method to protect patentees from pirating
competitors. Id.
32. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 732; see also Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343 (The patentee "[is]
deemed to claim every form in which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to
disclaim some of those forms.").
33. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
34. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 733. "The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those
insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be
created through trivial changes." Id.
35. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
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The doctrine of equivalents provides that a product or process that
does not literally infringe on a patented device may nevertheless infringe if
the elements of the accused device are deemed equivalent to the claimed
elements of the patented device. 36 In 1950, the Supreme Court in Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. pronounced the test
for equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents. The Court held that a
patentee may invoke the doctrine of equivalents to proceed against the
producer of an accusedly infringing device if it performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the
same result.37 This is known as the "function-way-result" test.
In order to foster innovation, the patent system must balance the pat-
entee's right to exclude with the public's right to adequate notice of what is
not protected by the patent, and thus still open for invention. 38 The doctrine
of equivalents enhances the strength of a patent and fosters the protective
function by giving the courts the flexibility to expand the patent's scope
beyond that of its literal terms.39 However, broad application of the doc-
trine of equivalents can diminish the notice function of patents by prevent-
ing the public from being able to determine the scope of a patent ex ante. 40
Uncertainty in the range of equivalents may stifle new invention and inno-
vation if competitors are unable to determine "what is a permitted alterna-
tive to a patented invention and what is an infringing equivalent."'41
Prosecution history alleviates some of the uncertainty caused by the doc-
trine of equivalents by allowing the public to use the prosecution history,
the public record of all proceedings before the United States Patent and
36. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); Graver Tank, 339
U.S. at 609.
37. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09; see also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40 (noting that
the "insubstantial differences" test may also be used to determine equivalence); Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (arguing that the function-way-result test
is not the only way of determining equivalence). Additionally, equivalence must be determined based
on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case at hand. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 ("What
constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the
particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and
is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.").
38. Conigliaro et al., supra note 20, at 1049.
39. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; see also Conigliaro et al., supra note 20, at 1056 ("In the
context of the doctrine of equivalents, the law best promotes progress by the careful balancing of dy-
namic protection for the patentee and clear notice to the public of what products will infringe the patent.
Each of these patent functions is fundamental, and it is only by their harmonious interplay that patent
law can encourage both technological improvements and pioneering inventions.").
40. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 ("There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents,
when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claim-
ing requirement.").




Trademark Office ("the PTO"), to anticipate the scope of potential equiva-
lents.42
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel mandates that a patent be
construed not only in the light of its claims but also with reference to the
prosecution history.43 One of the public policy principles underlying the
doctrine is that it allows other players in the marketplace to rely on the
public record of the patent prosecution to determine the meaning and scope
of the patent.44 Essentially, prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine
of equivalents by preventing a patentee from arguing equivalence with
respect to subject matter the patentee surrendered during prosecution of the
patent.45 While the doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to expand
the scope of a patent to cover unclaimed equivalents, prosecution history
estoppel precludes the patentee from regaining through litigation any sub-
ject matter relinquished during prosecution of the patent.
46
Prosecution history estoppel only bars a patentee from recapturing that
subject matter actually surrendered during prosecution of the patent.47 This
rule ensures that the doctrine remains tied to its underlying purpose: public
notice. If the patentee has not expressly or impliedly disclaimed any subject
matter during the prosecution of the patent, then the public will have no
42. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 398 (Ct. Cl. 1967). A patent's prose-
cution history is also sometimes referred to as its file wrapper, and thus prosecution history can also be
referred to as file wrapper estoppel.
43. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 733; see also Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 398 ("The [prosecution history]
contains the entire record of the proceedings in the Patent Office from the first application papers to the
issued patent. Since all express representations of the patent applicant made to induce a patent grant are
in the [prosecution history], this material provides an accurate charting of the patent's pre-issuance
history.").
44. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886). In White v. Dunbar, the patentee originally
obtained a patent for a process of preserving shrimp and other shellfish by lining the inside of a can
with a coating of asphaltum cement and then with paper coated with a solution of paraffine. The can
was then filled with shrimp, sealed, and subjected to a boiling or steaming process, in the usual manner
of canning vegetables and meats. Id. at 47-48. However, some time later, the patentee surrendered this
original patent, and applied for a reissue. The new patent claimed a similar process, except that the
shrimp was instead wrapped in a textile lining, and then placed in an uncoated can. The Court held that
such a change was "tantamount to a declaration that [the patentees had] claimed nothing else," and that
the public had a right to rely on such a declaration. Id. at 51; see also Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 727.
45. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
46. Id.
47. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. United States (Hughes II), 140 F.3d 1470, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In evaluating the reason
behind an amendment, a court must determine what subject matter the patentee actually surrendered.").
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reason to believe that the patentee has relinquished any equivalents. 48 Yet
if during the prosecution of the patent, the patentee represented that the
scope of the patent did not cover the equivalents in question, the public
could reasonably rely on this representation. The patentee would then be
estopped from attempting to reclaim this subject matter.49 However, it is
often a daunting task to determine what subject matter the patentee actually
surrendered, and thus, what the scope of prosecution history estoppel will
be in barring the patentee from reclaiming the equivalents in question. 50 To
determine whether subject matter has been relinquished, a court may look
to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would objectively conclude from
the prosecution history that an applicant surrendered it.51
C. Interaction Between the Two Doctrines
The intersection of prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of
equivalents arises most often when a patentee amends his patent claims in
response to a rejection of an earlier version of his patent application by the
PTO. By deciding to narrow a claim element in the face of a rejection by
the PTO rather than appeal the decision of the examiner, the patentee is
conceding that the invention as patented does not reach as far as the origi-
nal claim. 52 The crux of prosecution history estoppel is that, when the pat-
entee knowingly claims the subject matter alleged to infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents, but then narrows the claim in response to a rejec-
tion, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprises unforeseen
subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the
issued patent. Because the doctrine of equivalents is premised on the short-
comings of language, when a prior patent application actually describes the
precise element at issue and the patentee knowingly removes this language
from a claim in order to obtain a patent, he should be estopped from trying
48. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States (Hughes 1), 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
49. Id. ("The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent owner from obtaining a
claim construction that would resurrect subject matter surrendered during prosecution of his patent
application."); see also Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 564-65 ("The logic of prosecution history estoppel is that
the patentee, during prosecution, has created a record that fairly notifies the public that the patentee has
surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the patent.").
50. This issue is actually the main focus of this Note and will be discussed in much more detail
below when I discuss Warner-Jenkinson and the Festo line of cases. Here, I only intend to give some
very general remarks to orient the reader and lead into the next section.
51. Honeywell, 140 F.3d at 1462.




to recapture in an infringement action the very subject matter surrendered
as a condition of receiving the patent.
53
From the inception of both of these doctrines, courts have grappled
with the task of maintaining a balance between the protective and notice
functions of the patent laws. The courts that dealt with the Festo line of
cases were not immune from this objective and often found themselves at
the center of the conflict.
II. BACKGROUND OF FESTO v. SMC
The Festo line of cases began in 1988 when Festo sued Shoketsu Kin-
zoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd. ("SMC") in the Federal District Court of
Massachusetts for infringement of United States Patents 4,354,125 (the
"Stoll patent") and 3,779,401 (the "Carroll patent"). 54 The patents related
to magnetically coupled rodless cylinders composed of a cylinder, a piston,
and a sleeve. 55 Both patents were amended during prosecution to add prior
art references 56 and a new limitation that the inventions contain "a pair of
resilient sealing rings," each having a lip on one side.57 In addition, the
Stoll patent was amended to include a limitation that the sleeve be made of
a magnetizable material. 58 The district court entertained summary judgment
motions from both parties on the issues of infringement and validity, 59 but
ultimately denied all summary judgment motions except Festo's motion for
summary judgment of infringement of the Carroll patent.60 Ultimately, the
district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that SMC's ac-
cused device infringed claims 5, 6, and 9 of the Carroll patent under the
53. Honeywell, 140 F.3d at 1462 (holding that when an applicant narrows a claim element in the
face of an examiner's rejection based on the prior art, the doctrine estops the applicant from later assert-
ing that the claim covers, through the doctrine of equivalents, features that the applicant amended his
claim to avoid).
54. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo 1), No. Civ.A. 88-1814-MA,
1993 WL 1510657 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
55. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 579 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
56. Prior art is any
documentary and non-documentary sources used to determine the novelty and nonobvious-
ness of a claimed invention in a patent application. Documentary sources include printed pub-
lications, published patents, technical papers, and the like, available anywhere in the world.
Non-documentary sources include activities such as a public knowledge, use, sale or offer for
sale in the United States. Prior art must be dated or in existence prior to the applicant's date of
invention or, in the case of statutory bars, more than one year prior to the filing date of the
patent application.
BECKER, supra note 15, at app. cc.
57. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 728; Festo 1, 1993 WL 1510657, at *4.
58. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 728.
59. Festo 1, 1993 WL 1510657, at *2.
60. Id. at *27.
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doctrine of equivalents. 61 Additionally, a jury found both patents were not
invalid and that SMC's accused device infringed claim I of the Stoll patent
under the doctrine of equivalents.
62
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed these decisions. 63 The Su-
preme Court subsequently vacated the Federal Circuit's decision and re-
manded the case in light of its intervening decision in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.64 On remand, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit initially affirmed in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded,65 but the Federal Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc to resolve
certain issues relating to the doctrine of equivalents that remained in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson.66
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson set out to clarify the function and
scope of the doctrine of equivalents. 67 While the Court overwhelmingly
acknowledged the importance of maintaining the doctrine of equivalents
and refused to speak the death of it as Warner-Jenkinson invited, 68 it con-
61. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
62. Id.; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 585
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
63. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo 11), 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
64. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp. (Festo 111), 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); see
also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
65. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IV), 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
66. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 563.
67. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21.
68. Warner-Jenkinson argued that Congress had impliedly negated the doctrine, as set out in
Graver Tank in 1950, when it revised the Patent Act in 1952. Id. at 25. Petitioner gave four specific
reasons why the doctrine of equivalents was inconsistent with the Patent Act of 1952 and, thus, did not
survive the 1952 revision:
(1) The doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a patentee
specifically "claim" the invention covered by a patent, § 112; (2) the doctrine circumvents the
patent reissue process-designed to correct mistakes in drafting or the like-and avoids the
express limitations on that process, §§ 251-252; (3) the doctrine is inconsistent with the pri-
macy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting the scope of a patent through the
patent prosecution process; and (4) the doctrine was implicitly rejected as a general matter by
Congress' specific and limited inclusion of the doctrine in one section regarding "means"
claiming, § 112, 6.
Id. at 25-26. Quite to the contrary, the Court declined this offer to do away with the doctrine and over-
whelmingly reinforced the necessity of the doctrine. Id. at 28. The Court also rejected Warner-
Jenkinson's argument for a "rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change," id.
at 32; refused to "require judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing application of the
doctrine of equivalents," id. at 34; refused to require "proof of intent" on the part of the alleged in-
fringer before the doctrine of equivalents could be applied, id. at 35; and refused to adopt "independent
experimentation" as "an equitable defense to the doctrine of equivalents," id. The Court noted that, as it
is a judge-made rule, Congress could have directly legislated the doctrine of equivalents out of exis-
tence at any time and could have easily done so when revising the Patent Act. Id. at 28. However,
absent some concrete showing of Congress's intent to negate the doctrine, the Court unwaveringly
refused to do so especially in light of the doctrine's lengthy history. Id.
20071
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ceded that a robust application of the doctrine can undermine the public
notice function of a patent.69 To alleviate some of this tension, the Court
identified one means of limiting the application of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. The Court clarified that equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents
refers to equivalency of an element or part of the claimed invention, not to
equivalency of the claimed invention as a whole. 70
By drawing this distinction, the Court adopted what is known as the
all-elements or all-limitations rule. Under this rule, the doctrine of equiva-
lents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the inven-
tion as a whole. 71 In order to find equivalency under the doctrine, the
patentee must show the presence of every element or its substantial equiva-
lent in the accused device. 72 Furthermore, under the all-elements rule the
doctrine of equivalents cannot be used, even as to an individual element, in
a matter that would wholly vitiate a limitation contained in a patent claim. 73
The Court also recognized that prosecution history estoppel plays a
significant role in limiting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents. 74 How-
ever, the Court did not believe, as Warner-Jenkinson did, that an estoppel
would arise due to any surrender of subject matter during patent prosecu-
tion regardless of the applicant's reason for such surrender.75 According to
the Court, an applicant's reason for amendment during patent prosecution
is very relevant to determining whether prosecution history estoppel ap-
plies, and thus whether it can limit the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. 76 While the Court noted that it had most often applied prosecu-
tion history estoppel only where claims had been amended for a limited set
of reasons, such as where the applicant amended its claims to overcome the
prior art, it refused to adopt the rule "invoking an estoppel regardless of the
reasons for [amendment].
'77
69. Id. at 29.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Also, "each
element of a claim is material and essential" to defining the scope of the patented invention. Id. "To be
a 'substantial equivalent,' the element substituted in the accused device for the element set forth in the
claim must not be such as would substantially change the way in which the function of the claimed
invention is performed." Id. (citation omitted). The essential inquiry is whether "the accused product or
process contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention."
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
73. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
74. The Court agreed that "Graver Tank did not dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents." Id. at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 30-31.
77. Id. at 32.
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One of the most important decisions of the Court dealt with the situa-
tion where the record does not reveal the patentee's reason for making an
amendment. In order to protect the role of the claims in defining an inven-
tion and providing public notice, the Court held that the patentee bears the
burden of establishing its reason for making an amendment.78 When the
patentee cannot establish an explanation for making the amendment, the
Court held that it will presume that it was made for a substantial reason
related to patentability. 79 This is known as the Warner-Jenkinson presump-
tion. Lastly, the Court held that if the patentee cannot rebut the presump-
tion, prosecution history estoppel will apply and will bar the application of
the doctrine of equivalents to that claim element.80 This last rule became a
significant point of controversy in the Festo decisions. Other than in the
case of unexplained amendments, the Court did not speak on the range of
equivalents available to a patentee after prosecution history estoppel ap-
plies.
In Festo VI, the Federal Circuit's en banc decision following Warner-
Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit first addressed the situations in which a
claim amendment gives rise to prosecution history estoppel. Generally,
prosecution history estoppel arises when the patentee made a narrowing
amendment for a substantial reason related to patentability.8 1 The court
held that such a reason is not limited to amendments made to overcome or
avoid prior art as discussed in Warner-Jenkinson.82 An amendment made
for any reason relating to the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent
83
will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the amended
claim element. 84 The court specifically stated that this can include narrow-
ing amendments made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act, includ-
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 566 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 (holding that prosecution history estoppel arises
when an amendment is made for a "substantial reason related to patentability")).
82. Id. at 566.
83. The court gave several examples of some of the statutory requirements that must be satisfied
before a valid patent can issue and that thus relate to patentability. For example, the novelty and non-
obviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103; the requirement that the claims be directed to
patentable subject matter; the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101; and the requirement of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the patent specification describe, enable, and set forth the best mode
of carrying out the invention. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 566.
84. The court noted that a prosecution history estoppel may also arise based on the patentee's
arguments made before the PTO if they evidence a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.
Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 568. While argument-based estoppel will not be discussed further in this Note, it
is relevant in that it illustrates that the main inquiry in prosecution history estoppel is whether the
patentee has actually surrendered the subject matter in question.
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ing § 112, or a "voluntary" amendment, 85 i.e., one neither required by a
patent examiner nor made in response to a rejection by an examiner for a
stated reason.
86
At the crux of its decision in Festo VI, the court addressed what range
of equivalents, if any, would be available under the doctrine of equivalents
if a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel. This issue was
first addressed in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ("Hughes 1") when
the Federal Circuit adopted the "flexible bar" rule. 87 In Hughes I, the court
refused to adopt a "wooden application of estoppel" in which virtually any
claim amendment would bar the patentee from resorting to the doctrine of
equivalents. 88 Instead, the court held that based on the subject matter sur-
rendered by the amendment, a patentee may still claim some range of
equivalents for that subject matter, with the available spectrum of equiva-
lents ranging "from great to small to zero." 89 The court advocated a flexi-
ble, case-by-case analysis in which the "nature and purpose" of the
amendment and the exact subject matter surrendered by the patentee would
determine the range of equivalents open to the patentee. 90
While recognizing that most cases since Hughes I applied this "flexi-
ble bar" rule, the Festo VI court noted that in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,91
decided less than a year after Hughes I, the Federal Circuit took a strict
approach to determining the range of equivalents available when prosecu-
tion history estoppel applied. 92 Because the Federal Circuit had never repu-
diated Kinzenbaw, the court felt it was unclear which line of authority a
court would use in any given case, and therefore, with "its special exper-
tise,"'93 it set out to reconcile the two conflicting lines of authority. 94 Seem-
ingly contrary to a great amount of precedent following Hughes I, the court
followed Kinzenbaw and held that when prosecution history estoppel ap-
85. The court, in holding so, reasoned that "[tihere is no reason why prosecution history estoppel
should arise if the Patent Office rejects a claim because it believes the claim to be unpatentable, but not
arise if the applicant amends a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable." Id.
86. Id. In Festo IX, the Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Festo VIII did
not upset these holdings and reinstated them. 344 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
87. See 717 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 1362.
89. "Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a
spectrum ranging from great to small to zero." Id. at 1363.
90. Id.
91. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 389, discussed in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI),
234 F.3d 558, 572-73 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
93. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 572 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 40 (1997)).
94. See id. at 573-74.
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plies, the patentee is completely barred from claiming any equivalents in
the entire territory between the original claim limitation and the amended
claim, thus rejecting the flexible bar approach. 95
The court noted several problems with the flexible bar approach. First,
the court reasoned that the flexible bar approach did not promote certainty
in patent law. The court explained that from an adjudicator's perspective, it
was unclear how to apply the rule and, therefore, use of the flexible bar rule
did not produce consistent results.96 Because there are no clear or system-
atic criteria for determining what equivalents are surrendered when a patent
claim is amended, the flexible bar rule is "unworkable. ' 97 Furthermore,
because it is "virtually impossible to predict before [a judicial decision]
where the line of surrender is drawn," a future inventor would have no way
of reliably determining what equivalents the patentee might claim.98 Sec-
ond, the court felt that the flexible bar approach did not serve to enforce the
disclaimer effect of a narrowing claim amendment.99 The flexible bar ap-
proach might allow a patentee to reclaim subject matter discarded through a
narrowing amendment.' 00 Last, the flexible bar approach did not preserve
the notice function of patent claims. 101 When it is uncertain what range of
equivalents is preserved after prosecution, allowing some range of equiva-
lents does not put the public on notice of whether prosecution history es-
toppel arises as to any claim element.102
On the other hand, the complete bar rule directly comports with these
three fundamental objectives of patent law by construing amendments
strictly against the patentee and by putting both the patentee and the public
on notice as to the scope of protection provided by a claim element. 103
According to the court, by eliminating the public's need to speculate as to
the subject matter surrendered when prosecution history estoppel arises and
95. Id. at 574. Interestingly enough, as the IEEE points out in its Brief of Amicus Curiae, the court
in Kinzenbaw "made no mention of overruling Hughes, and the flexible bar of Hughes became the
dominant line of Federal Circuit authority-until Festo [VI]." Brief of IEEE, supra note 19, at 15.
IEEE, advocating for a foreseeability standard in the application of prosecution history estoppel, argued
that "Kinzenbaw plainly ,uggested that, if the particular limiting effect created by the patentee's
amendments to the patent's claim language had been unforeseeable, the doctrine of equivalents would
still have been available to the patentee." Id. at 20. Thus, according to IEEE, Kinzenbaw does not
actually stand for a complete bar rule as the Federal Circuit claims it does.










by putting the public on notice of the range of available equivalents, the
complete bar rule will promote technological advancements by eliminating
the risk of infringement claims. 104 By using the complete bar rule, the risk
of infringement will be easier to determine and, therefore, "[t]he public will
be free to improve on the patented technology and design around it without
being inhibited by the threat of a lawsuit."' 05 Additionally, the court noted
that by adding certainty to the process of determining the scope of protec-
tion afforded a patent, patentees will not need to resort to litigation to "as-
certain[] the true scope and value of the patent."' 106 While the court noted
that the complete bar rule offered less protection to patentees, it felt that the
benefits of certainty outweighed the costs to patentees. 1
07
Because the Federal Circuit's en banc decision radically altered the in-
teraction between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equiva-
lents, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the relation between
the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel. 108
In Festo VIII, Justice Kennedy, speaking for a unanimous Court, over-
turned the Federal Circuit's complete bar rule and held that an amendment
is not an absolute bar to a claim of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 109 Instead, the Court established a presumption-known now
as the Festo presumption-that a narrowing amendment made for a reason
related to patentability surrenders the particular subject matter in ques-
tion.1 10 The patentee may, however, rebut the presumption by showing that
"at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the
alleged equivalent."' 1 1
A patentee may establish that the narrowing amendments did not sur-
render the particular equivalent in question and thus rebut the Festo pre-
sumption by showing that (1) the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time
of the application; (2) the rationale underlying the amendment bears no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or (3) there is
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not be reasonably
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. 112 These
104. Id. at 577; Conigliaro et al., supra note 20, at 1062.
105. Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 577.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 578.
108. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VII), 533 U.S. 915 (2001).
109. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722, 737
(2002).
110. Id. at 740.
111. Id. at 741.
112. Id. at 740-4 1.
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three rebuttal criteria, and in particular the third, are the focus of this Note.
While the Court was attempting to protect the proprietary rights of the pat-
entee in making the third rebuttal criterion a "catch-all" of sorts, as will be
discussed more below, this has grave implications for the notice function of
the patent laws.
In Festo VIII, the Court attempted to address both the uncertainty of
the flexible bar rule and the apparent injustice to patentees of the complete
bar rule. The Court attempted to balance the notice and the protective func-
tions of patent law at the intersection of prosecution history estoppel and
the doctrine of equivalents. Several considerations led the Court to overturn
the decision of the Federal Circuit and adopt this new method for determin-
ing the range of equivalents available to a patentee after making a narrow-
ing amendment related to patentability.
Above all, the Court relied heavily on the fundamental principles un-
derlying the doctrine of equivalents and the patent laws in general. In order
to maintain the balance between the public notice and protective functions
of the patent laws, inventors are required to describe their work in "full,
clear, concise, and exact terms."1 13 Without this clarity, would-be inventors
will be unable to discern where the patentee's rights end, and where the
subject matter left open to the public begins. 1 4 However, the Court recog-
nized that describing an invention through the use of mere words has its
shortcomings. 115 The Court explained that, because of the nature of lan-
guage, there are times when an inventor is unable to capture the essence of
his invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty in
a patent application. 116 It was for these reasons that the Supreme Court in
Winans adopted the doctrine of equivalents. 117
Furthermore, according to the Court the language used to describe the
claimed invention becomes no less ambiguous after the amendment than
before.1 8 Therefore, while a patentee may concede that the amended claim
is different from and does not reach as far as the original, this does not
mean that the language used in the amended claim is so perfect as to make
it impossible for a copyist to devise an equivalent. 119 As a result, a rule that
abolishes the doctrine of equivalents and holds the patentee to the literal
113. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
114. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 730-31.
115. Id. at 731.
116. Id.
117. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853).
118. "After amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention." Festo VIII,




terms of the patent makes no sense. By failing to inquire into the subject
matter actually surrendered by the narrowing amendment, the Court
deemed that the Federal Circuit's approach was "inconsistent with the pur-
pose of applying the estoppel in the first place-to hold the inventor to the
representations made during the application process and to the inferences
that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment."'
120
While the Court recognized that the doctrine of equivalents renders
the scope of patents less certain, it nonetheless stressed the necessity of
maintaining the doctrine. Furthermore, the Court noted that while the flexi-
ble bar may have been unworkable, the complete bar rule did not serve to
protect the interest of the patentees. The doctrine of equivalents allows the
patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in
drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial
changes. Relying on Warner-Jenkinson for the notion that "equivalents
remain a firmly entrenched part of the settled rights protected by the pat-
ent," 121 and other cases confirming the doctrine, 122 the Court overturned
the Federal Circuit's complete bar rule. While the Court's reasoning up to
this point seems well founded in doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel jurisprudence, the basis for the Festo presumption is less
clear.
III. ANALYSIS OF WHY AND HOW THE THIRD REBUTTAL CRITERION
MUST BE LIMITED
The Supreme Court's decision in Festo VIII drastically changed how
the courts and patent practitioners alike must approach cases implicating
both the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel.123 While
it has been almost four years since this significant decision, a number of
important questions concerning the Court's formulation of the Festo pre-
sumption, and the third rebuttal criterion in particular, remain unanswered.
For example, what types of "other reason[s]" would suggest that a patentee
could not reasonably have been expected to have claimed the equivalent in
question? What is the purpose of the third rebuttal criterion? Does this re-
120. Id. at 737-38.
121. Id. at 733.
122. Id. at 732 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950); Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 342.
123. As stated by Donald Chisum, a leading scholar on patent law, "[i]t would be difficult to exag-
gerate the significance of Festo to the United States patent system." Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme
Court's Festo Decision: Implications for Patent Claim Scope and Other Issues, CHISM ON PATENTS
CASE REPORTER, June 2002, at 3, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/ practicear-
eas/ip/pdfs/chisumfesto.pdf.
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buttal criterion adequately preserve both the protective and notice functions
of patent law?
The ensuing analysis will attempt to resolve these questions and will
demonstrate that the only way to preserve the third rebuttal criterion is to
limit it to only those situations in which some shortcoming of language
prevented the patentee from adequately claiming the equivalent in question.
Part A of this analysis will discuss the Supreme Court's reasons for adopt-
ing the three criteria and where it found support for creating them. This
information is critical to determining the purpose of the three rebuttal crite-
ria and their respective functions as envisioned by the Court. Part B will
survey subsequent cases interpreting and applying Festo VIII. Analyzing
how the third rebuttal criterion has recently been used will shed light on
why this criterion should be limited to the shortcomings of language. Fi-
nally, Part C will discuss the policy implications of the third rebuttal crite-
rion as it was handed down by the Supreme Court. Discussing these
considerations will ultimately lead to the conclusion that limiting the third
rebuttal criterion will optimize both the protective and notice functions.
A. Basis for the Supreme Court's Decision in Festo VIII
Uncovering what the Supreme Court envisioned as the purpose of the
three rebuttal criteria and how it justified them will lead to a better under-
standing of their respective functions and utility. Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court did not expressly state why or how it formulated the Festo
presumption or chose the three rebuttal criteria. Yet, by closely scrutinizing
the Court's decision and looking to several key cases discussing the pur-
poses of the doctrine of equivalents, one can hypothesize what laid the
foundation for the presumption, the three rebuttal criteria, and the purpose
that each criterion was to serve.
Most notably, in overturning the Federal Circuit's "complete bar" rule
to prosecution history estoppel, the Supreme Court chose to adopt the pre-
sumption-rebuttal method advocated by the United States (the "Govern-
ment") in its amicus brief.124 The Government argued that while the
flexible bar rule was "unsatisfactory," the complete bar promulgated by the
Federal Circuit "does not comport with [the Supreme] Court's measured
perspective in Warner-Jenkinson and fails to strike a sound balance be-
124. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740. The Court stated that it agreed with the United States that the
patentee should bear the burden of showing that an amendment does not surrender the particular equiva-
lent in question. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722
(No. 00-1543), 2001 WL 1025650 [hereinafter Brief for the U.S.].
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tween certainty of patent scope and fair protection of patent rights."'125
Instead, the Court should presume that a narrowing amendment bars a pat-
entee from claiming any range of equivalents. 126 However, the patentee
should be able to rebut this presumption by "showing a concrete ba-
sis.., for extending the amended portion of the claim beyond its literal
terms to encompass equivalent elements."' 127 In other words, the Govern-
ment advocated that the patentee should bear the burden of showing that
the narrowing amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in
question. 12
8
While clear support for how the Supreme Court devised the Festo pre-
sumption lies in the Government's brief, support for the three rebuttal crite-
rion can also be found in the Government's brief, scattered across the pre-
Festo VIII caselaw, and, by inference, within the Court's decision itself.
1. Support for the First, "Unforeseeable," Rebuttal Criterion
In its brief, the Government suggested two situations in which the pat-
ent holder could rebut the presumption of surrender. First, a patent holder
should be allowed to assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
if the assertedly equivalent element "did not exist and was not reasonably
within the contemplation of the PTO and the applicant" at the time of
amendment.129 If the assertedly equivalent element in question was a tech-
nology that arose after the patent holder amended its claims, prosecution
history estoppel should not bar the use of the doctrine of equivalents. 130
This follows from the Supreme Court's endorsement in Hughes I that after-
arising technologies can still fall within the range of equivalents allowed to
a patentee who has amended its claims. The Court in Festo VIII seemingly
molded this suggestion by the Government into the first, "unforeseeable,"
rebuttal criterion.
125. Brief for the U.S., supra note 124, at 10.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740; see also Brief for the U.S., supra note 124, at 23 ("The patent
holder rightly should bear the burden of demonstrating that the claim amendments preserve the type of
equivalents at issue because the patent laws themselves require the patent applicant to define claims
with specificity, 35 U.S.C. 112, 'not only to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the
public of what is still open to them."' (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891))).
129. Brief for the U.S., supra note 124, at 25-26.
130. That is,
a patent holder should be allowed to assert that an accused device infringes under the doctrine
of equivalents if the court finds that the assertedly equivalent element is itself an innovation
that was not known to persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time the applicant amended
the claim.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
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Along with these arguments made by the Government, support for the
unforeseeability criterion appears in cases where the equivalent element in
question was an after-arising technology. These cases could have been an
impetus for the Supreme Court to create the first rebuttal criterion. In War-
ner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the doctrine
of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that were known at the time
the patent was issued and should not extend to after-arising equivalents. 131
The Federal Circuit in Hughes I later explained that while an inventor is
required to disclose the best mode known to him for practicing his inven-
tion, 132 he is not charged with "predict[ing] all future developments which
enable the practice of his invention in substantially the same way." 133 The
court felt it would be inequitable to allow a subsequent advance in technol-
ogy not available to the patentee at the time of the amendment to fall out-
side of the scope of the patent's protection. 134 The fact that such a later-
developed technology may result in an insubstantial change in the way the
claimed element in question performed its function supports the idea that
the patentee should not be barred from claiming equivalency over equiva-
lents arising out of later developed technology. 135 As a patentee cannot be
expected to claim equivalent technology that has not yet been developed,
after-arising technology presents clear support for the unforeseeability stan-
dard.
131. As Justice Thomas stated,
Insofar as the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is
equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-and thus
knowledge of interchangeability between elements-is at the time of infringement, not at the
time the patent was issued. And rejecting the milder version of petitioner's argument neces-
sarily rejects the more severe proposition that equivalents must not only be known, but must
also be actually disclosed in the patent in order for such equivalents to infringe upon the pat-
ent.
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,37 (1997).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
133. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States (Hughes 1), 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
134. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States (Hughes 11), 140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[L]ater devel-
oped computer technology.., should be deemed within the scope of the claims to avoid the pirating of
an invention.").
135. For example, in Hughes 1, the Federal Circuit found that
[a]dvanced computers and digital communications techniques developed since Williams per-
mit doing on-board a part of what Williams taught as done on the ground. As one of our
predecessor courts, the Court of Claims, has thrice made clear, that partial variation in tech-
nique, an embellishment made possible by post-Williams technology, does not allow the ac-
cused spacecraft to escape the "web of infringement."
717 F.2d at 1365 (quoting Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
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2. Support for the Second, "Tangential Relation," Rebuttal Criterion
As support for the second, "tangential relation," criterion, the Supreme
Court may have turned to Hughes I, which contemplated that prosecution
history estoppel should not bar a patentee from asserting equivalents when
the reason for amendment is unrelated to the equivalent in question. The
particular facts of that case are illustrative of this scenario. Hughes Aircraft
asserted that several NASA satellites infringed its patent covering satellite
altitude control technology. In the plaintiffs system, the satellite transmit-
ted reference position information to Earth, enabling a ground crew to cal-
culate the satellite's spin rate, sun angle, and instantaneous spin angle
("ISA") position, i.e., "the measure of where the satellite is in its spin cycle
at any instant of time." 136 After calculating the ISA position, the ground
crew then transmitted firing signals to a jet on the satellite, causing it to fire
immediately and adjust the altitude of the satellite.
As distinct from the plaintiffs invention, a computer housed on the
NASA spacecraft received the reference position information, calculated
the spin rate, and transmitted it to the ground crew along with sufficient
information for calculating the sun angle. The ground crew did not know
and did not need to know the ISA position in order to control the altitude of
the spacecraft. Because of this distinction, the court held that there was no
literal infringement. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant's computer-aided altitude control system was equivalent
to its patented invention. However, the defendant asserted that prosecution
history estoppel barred use of the doctrine of equivalents because the plain-
tiff had made narrowing amendments to its claims to distinguish its inven-
tion over a space vehicle utilizing similar technology patented by
McLean. 137 In response to the rejection, the plaintiff amended its claims to
distinguish its invention over that of McLean.
The Federal Circuit held that prosecution history estoppel did not bar
the plaintiff from asserting that the NASA spacecraft infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents. In making this decision, the court stated that "[the
plaintiff's] amendment of the claims did not relate to any disclosure, in the
prior art or elsewhere, in which the ISA position was stored in a com-
puter .... ,1138 The plaintiff's reason for amending its claims was to distin-
guish the McLean patent, not to disavow claim scope relating to computer
136. Id. at 1360.
137. Specifically, the examiner rejected the plaintiff's original claims as unpatentable in light of a
prior invention disclosed in the McLean patent. The McLean satellite was self-guided and had a self-
contained altitude control system. Id. at 1354.
138. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added).
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technology, and therefore the court found it unnecessary to bar the plaintiff
from utilizing the doctrine of equivalents. This reasoning laid the ground-
work for the tangential relation rebuttal criterion promulgated by the Su-
preme Court. In Festo VIII, the Court seemingly agreed with the holding of
Hughes I that when the asserted equivalent is only peripherally related to
the reason for amendment, use of the doctrine of equivalents should not be
foreclosed. 139
3. Support for the Third, "Some Other Reason," Rebuttal Criterion
In its brief, the Government also suggested that a patent holder could
rebut the presumption of surrender by establishing that, "owing to the na-
ture of the subject matter at issue, it was not possible for one of ordinary
skill in the art to draft a claim amendment that literally encompassed the
allegedly equivalent element while disclaiming the surrendered subject
matter."'140 The Government explained that the foundation of the doctrine
of equivalents lies in the idea that limiting a patent claim's scope to its
literal interpretation offers little protection to the patentee. 141 Recognizing
instances where "literal terms" may be inadequate to "reasonably describe
all of the insubstantial substitutes" for an element of a claimed invention, it
argued that patentees should not be completely precluded from using the
doctrine of equivalents to defend their proprietary interests. 142 The impetus
behind this reasoning was the idea that in some cases, mere words may not
be able to adequately describe the patentee's invention, especially if the
subject matter of the invention is particularly novel. 143 According to the
Government, the patentee should not be precluded from asserting equiva-
lents under the doctrine of equivalents if the shortcomings of language
prevented it from adequately claiming the equivalent in question.
While the Supreme Court's explanation for the three rebuttal criteria is
sparse, the language used by the Government most resembled that of the
139. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722, 740
(2002).
140. Brief for the U.S., supra note 124, at 26.
141. "The doctrine of equivalents arose from concerns that the 'unsparing logic' of literalism can
deny the patent holder fair patent protection." Id. at 26 (quoting Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.)).
142. Id. at 26.
143. "Given the versatility of language, patent holders will face a substantial obstacle in overcom-
ing the presumption that their narrowed claims encompass no more than they literally embrace. But that
challenge would not be insurmountable if the technology is complex or the alleged distinctions are
trivial." Id. at 27.
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Court in promulgating the third rebuttal criterion. 144 Also, as the Govern-
ment seemingly accounted for unforeseeable equivalents in the first situa-
tion discussed, and as nothing it discussed shows any support for the
tangential relation criterion, it is reasonable to deduce that the Court
molded this second situation posed by the Government into its third rebut-
tal criterion. More importantly, assuming that the Supreme Court did in-
deed adopt the Government's argument, it is also reasonable to believe that
the Court envisioned the third rebuttal criterion as a way to protect the pat-
entee from the inability of mere words to describe particularly novel and
pioneering inventions.
In deciding to breathe life back into the doctrine of equivalents and
strike down the complete bar rule promulgated by the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court in Festo VIII discussed in detail how the shortcomings of
language provide the foundation for the doctrine. 145 The Court noted that
the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees from copy-
ists who may attempt to evade the literal scope of a patent by exploiting the
ambiguity and imprecision of the language chosen by the patentee to claim
its invention. 146 While literalism may render the scope of patents more
certain, the Court stated that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to
protect patentees and to ensure the appropriate incentives for innovation. 147
According to the Court, the very doctrine is "premised on language's in-
ability to capture the essence of innovation."' 148
Along with the foundation laid by the Government, the Supreme Court
also had many past cases dealing with the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel to guide its decision. Citing Autogiro Co. of
America v. United States, the Court discussed why the doctrine of equiva-
lents is important to protect the patentee from unscrupulous copyists. Be-
cause words are by their nature ambiguous, 149 "the phrasing of a
document... seldom attains more than approximate precision."' 150 Since
the ability to verbalize the outer boundaries of one's invention is critical to
the patent laws, this imprecision of language creates a significant challenge
144. "[T]here may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be




147. Id. at 732-33.
148. Id. at 734.
149. "The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous claim a rare occurrence."
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
150. Id. (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947)).
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for patent applicants. 151 Impressing upon the Supreme Court the extreme
difficulty faced by patentees to describe their invention in written words,
the court in Autogiro powerfully stated that
[a]n invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series
of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to sat-
isfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words
allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Of-
ten the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dic-
tionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.
152
For these reasons, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the
doctrine of equivalents to protect patentees from the dangers of literalism.
Conclusively, the Government's brief and relevant case law provide
firm support for the first two rebuttal criteria laid out by the Supreme Court
in Festo VIII. It is clear that the Supreme Court envisioned some instances,
other than when the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of
the amendment or when the asserted equivalent was only tangentially re-
lated to the patentee's reason for amending its claims, in which a patentee
could not reasonably be expected to have described the equivalent element
in question. However, without searching every case in which a patentee
asserted infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and determining
which cases might not have been taken into account under the first two
rebuttal criteria, it is difficult to know what situations the Court believed
fell under the regime of the third rebuttal criterion. By drawing some con-
clusions based on precedent and what the Court discussed as the most basic
support for the doctrine of equivalents, it seems that the shortcomings of
language are the most appropriate "other reason" that a patentee would be
unable to describe the alleged equivalent in question.
While it is reasonable at this point to assume that the Court considered
the shortcomings of language to fall under the third rebuttal criterion, the
Court's opinion on its own is not enough to support limiting the third rebut-
tal criterion to this situation exclusively. Analyzing the post-Festo VIII case
law provides additional support.
B. Cases Applying the Festo Presumption
The first and most influential case to interpret and apply the Supreme
Court's decision in Festo VIII was Festo IX, the Federal Circuit's decision
on remand to determine whether Festo could demonstrate that its narrowing
151. Id. at 397.
152. Id.
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amendments did not surrender the particular equivalents in question. 153 In
Festo IX, the Federal Circuit first clarified the interplay between the Festo
and Warner-Jenkinson presumptions. 154 The court also provided general
guidance for applying the three rebuttal criteria established in Festo VIII.
In Festo VI, the court held that if a patentee is unable to rebut the
Warner-Jenkinson presumption, prosecution history estoppel completely
bars the patentee from claiming any range of equivalents for an amended
claim element. 155 However, in light of Festo VIII, the Federal Circuit in
Festo IX held that an unexplained amendment, which gives rise to a prose-
cution history estoppel under Warner-Jenkinson should be treated like any
other narrowing amendment made for a reason related to patentability.1
56
"A patentee is now entitled to rebut the presumption that an 'unexplained'
narrowing amendment surrendered the entire territory between the original
and the amended claim limitations."'
157
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the three rebuttal criteria laid
the groundwork for all subsequent cases involving the doctrine of equiva-
lents where prosecution history estoppel applies. First, the court stated that
the first rebuttal criterion, unforeseeability, is an objective inquiry and is
assessed at the time of the amendment. 158 In explaining the first rebuttal
criterion, the court specifically endorsed later-developed technology and
technology that was not known in the relevant art as being unforeseeable
equivalents. 159 Conversely, an alleged equivalent is foreseeable if it was
known in the prior art in the field of the invention at the time of the
amendment. 160 Second, the court further explained that the second criterion
153. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 741-42.
154. Specifically, the Federal Circuit on remand asked the parties to brief the following issues:
1. Whether rebuttal of the presumption of surrender, including issues of foreseeability, tan-
gentialness, or reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art, is a question of law or one
of fact; and what role a jury should play in determining whether a patent owner can rebut the
presumption. 2. What factors are encompassed by the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court.
3. If a rebuttal determination requires factual findings, then whether, in this case, remand to
the district court is necessary to determine whether Festo can rebut the presumption that any
narrowing amendment surrendered the equivalent now asserted, or whether the record as it
now stands is sufficient to make those determinations. 4. If remand to the district court is not
necessary, then whether Festo can rebut the presumption that any narrowing amendment sur-
rendered the equivalent now asserted.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
155. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 578 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
156. Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1366 (noting that "a patentee's failure to overcome the Warner-
Jenkinson presumption gives rise to the new Festo presumption of surrender").
157. Id.
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requires an inquiry into "whether the reason for the narrowing amendment
was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent."' 16 1 This
inquiry "focuses on the patentee's objectively apparent reason for the nar-
rowing amendment" and on the context in which the amendment was
made. 162
Last, the court held that the scope of the "vague" third criterion must
be applied narrowly. 163 Relying on similar reasoning as the Supreme Court
in Festo VIII, the court stated that one method to rebut the Festo presump-
tion under the third criterion would to argue that the ambiguity or impreci-
sion of language prevented the patentee from claiming the equivalent in
question when the claim was narrowed. 164 The court qualified this state-
ment by holding that if the alleged equivalent is in the prior art, the pat-
entee would have been able to describe the equivalent in question, and
therefore, may not rely on the third rebuttal criterion. 165 Additionally, the
court limited the inquiry to what is contained in the prosecution history. 166
While the court recognized that the scope of the third rebuttal criterion
must be limited, it did not explicitly demarcate how narrowly it must be
applied. In fact, the court refused to speculate on or provide an exhaustive
list of the type of circumstances that might satisfy the third criterion. 167 It is
telling, however, that the court did speak of the imprecision of language as
one method of rebutting the presumption under the third criterion. It may
be reasonable to assume that the Federal Circuit only spoke of this method
because it simply could not foresee any other arguments that a patentee
could tender that, in its view, would satisfy the third rebuttal criterion. It
may also be reasonable to assume that the Federal Circuit felt that allowing
a patentee to rebut the third criterion with this argument aligned best with
the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents as a whole. Throughout the his-
tory of the doctrine, the idea that shortcomings of language act to diminish
161. Id. The court specifically noted that "an amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the
equivalent in question is not tangential; it is central to allowance of the claim." Id.
162. Id. at 1369-70. The court noted that the patentee's objective reasoning in making an amend-
ment and the particular context surrounding the amendment should be discemable from the prosecution
history. Therefore, courts should only consider the prosecution history when determining whether a
patentee has established a merely tangential reason for a narrowing amendment. Id.
163. Id. at 1370.
164. The court stated that "the third criterion may be satisfied" in this manner. Id. (emphasis
added). This suggests that while the court did not contemplate any other methods for satisfying the third
criterion, this was simply one way of doing so.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. "Because we cannot anticipate all of the circumstances in which a patentee might rebut the
presumption of surrender, we believe that discussion of the relevant factors encompassed by each of the
rebuttal criteria is best left to development on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 1368.
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
the patentee's right to exclude was a touchstone in the policies underlying
the doctrine.
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit determined that for both the sealing
ring and magnetizable sleeve limitations, Festo could not rebut the pre-
sumption of surrender under the third rebuttal criterion. 168 For both limita-
tions, Festo argued that the patentees could not reasonably have been
expected to have drafted claims covering the equivalents in question be-
cause they were "inferior and unacceptable design[s]. '' 169 Curiously, in
rejecting the plaintiffs arguments for rebuttal under the third criterion, the
court seemed to base its decision on the grounds that "there was no linguis-
tic or 'other' limitation" to prevent the patentee from describing the equiva-
lent in question. 170 This strongly suggests that the only method the court
contemplated for rebutting the third criterion was to argue that some short-
coming of language prevented the patentee from literally claiming the
equivalent in question.
The cases following and interpreting Festo IX also support limiting the
use of the third rebuttal criterion to situations arising out of the ambiguity
of language. Since Festo IX, few patentees have argued to rebut the Festo
presumption under the third criterion. Even fewer have been successful.17
168. Id. at 1370-73. Additionally, the court determined that for the sealing ring limitation of both
the Stoll and Carroll patents, Festo could not rebut the presumption of surrender under the second
criterion., The court similarly determined that for the magnetizable sleeve equivalent, Festo could not
rebut the presumption of surrender under either the "tangential" or "some other reason" criteria. How-
ever, the court held that factual issues remained as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have thought an aluminum sleeve was an objectively unforeseeable equivalent of a magnetizeable
sleeve and whether a single two-way sealing ring was an objectively unforeseeable equivalent of two
one-way sealing rings located at each end of the piston. The court remanded to the district court to
resolve these issues of fact. ld.
169. Id. at 1372.
170. Id. Even more telling is the actual language the court uses to transition into this quoted phrase.
For the magnetizable sleeve limitation, after summarizing Festo's argument for rebuttal under the third
criterion, the court dismissed it on the grounds that it actually suggested that the patentee could have
described the equivalent but chose not to. The court then stated that "[i]n any event, it seems clear that
there was no linguistic or 'other' limitation to prevent [the patentee] from describing the accused
equivalent," id. (emphasis added), suggesting that this is an even stronger reason for holding that Festo
could not rebut the presumption. For the sealing ring limitation, the court in the same fashion and for
the same reason dismissed Festo's argument for rebuttal by stating, "More to the point, it cannot be said
that there was a linguistic or 'other' limitation preventing [the patentees] from describing the equivalent
in question, especially where, as here, the difference between the claimed limitation and the accused
equivalent is principally a difference in quantity." Id. at 1373 (emphasis added). This strong language
suggests that the ultimate way to rebut the third rebuttal criterion is to argue for a shortcoming of lan-
guage.
171. In one case, the plaintiff was actually successful in rebutting the Festo presumption under the
third criterion by arguing a reason other than the shortcomings of language. In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., the plaintiff successfully argued under the third rebuttal criterion it could not have
reasonably been expected to describe the equivalent in question "because competitors and those skilled
in the art would have interpreted the amendment, at the time it was made, actually to cover the equiva-
lent." 287 F. Supp. 2d 126, 156-57 (D. Mass. 2003).
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One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the patentees simply
were not making the right arguments. For example, in both Biagro Western
Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc. 172 and Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v.
Unocal Corp.,173 the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments un-
der the third rebuttal criterion, holding that the plaintiffs were attempting to
reargue claim construction issues. The patentee in Abbott Laboratories v.
Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. unsuccessfully argued under the
third rebuttal criterion that it was unable to describe the equivalents in
question because there "would not be sufficient space to list them all" in
the claims. 174 In Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. Brainlab Medizinische
Computersystems GMBH, the patentee unsuccessfully asserted under the
third criterion that he was unable to describe the equivalent in question
because it was not "commercially available to him at the time he filed his
patent application."175
Adding even more support, while most of the post-Festo IX cases rec-
ognized the Federal Circuit's proposition that the ambiguity of language
was one method of rebutting the third criterion, the United States Court of
Federal Claims in Masco Corp. v. United States 176 seemed to treat it as the
only acceptable "other reason" for failing to literally describe the asserted
equivalent. The court held that the plaintiff did not rebut the Festo pre-
sumption under the third rebuttal criterion because it "did not establish that
a precise vocabulary did not exist at the time of the drafting."'1 77 The court
172. 423 F.3d 1296, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In Biagro, the Federal Circuit held that the patentee had
presumptively surrendered any equivalents with respect to the amount of phosphorous-containing acid
or salt present in fertilizer described in its patent by making a narrowing amendment during reexamina-
tion that added a claim limitation requiring phosphorous-containing acid or salt to be "present in an
amount of about 30 to about 40 weight percent." Id. at 1305-06. Biagro attempted to rebut the Festo
presumption under the third criterion by arguing that it understood the claim language to refer to a
chemically equivalent amount of phosphorous acid. The court rejected Biagro's contention as "merely
an attempt to reargue the claim construction issue." Id. at 1307.
173. 347 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Talbert, the plaintiff claimed infringement of its
United States Patent No. 5,015,356 (the "'356 patent") under the doctrine of equivalents. However,
during prosecution of it's '356 patent for carbureted gasoline, the plaintiff limited the claims to a gaso-
line boiling point range of 1210 F to 3450 F. Id. at 1358. Unocal produced a carbureted gasoline that
boiled above 3450 F. The court held that the amendment of the Talbert claims to a boiling point upper
limit of 3450 F was a presumptive surrender of gasolines boiling above that limit, and thus presumed
that prosecution history estoppel prevented Talbert from attempting to reclaim that subject matter
through the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1359. Attempting to rebut the Festo presumption under the
third criterion, the plaintiff argued that the claims contained an "unnecessarily exact boiling limit." Id.
at 1360. The court stated that it was "without power to make such a correction." Id. ("Courts can neither
broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different than what he has set
forth."(quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
174. No. 01 C 1867, 2005 WL 2347221, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2005).
175. 417 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1197 (D. Colo. 2006).
176. 56 Fed. Cl. 400 (2003).
177. Id. at 412.
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went on to point out that "[n]o subtlety of language or complexity of the
technology" would have rendered the patentee unable to literally describe
the equivalent in question. 178 Notably, patentees were most successful in
rebutting the third rebuttal criterion when they asserted that the shortcom-
ings of language prevented them from describing the equivalent in ques-
tion. 1
79
It logically follows from these post-Festo IX cases that the imprecision
of language should be the only acceptable reason for rebutting the Festo
presumption under the third criterion. First, as demonstrated by the Biagro
and Talbert cases, limiting the third criterion in this manner will prevent
patentees from resurrecting past issues and arguments, such as claim con-
struction, during the Festo presumption phase of the litigation. Second, by
giving patentees a definite method for approaching the third rebuttal crite-
rion, it is possible that more will attempt to argue it, and will argue it suc-
cessfully. Third, as will be discussed more below, the third rebuttal
criterion must be limited in order to restore balance between the notice and
protective functions. As courts are most receptive to the argument that
some shortcoming of language prevented the patentee from describing the
asserted equivalent, this is the most logical way to limit the third criterion.
C. Effect on the Protective and Notice Functions
As discussed above, the doctrines of equivalents and prosecution his-
tory estoppel are in constant tension. In order to effectuate the constitu-
tional command to promote the useful arts, these doctrines must be
enforced in a manner that balances patent law's protective and notice func-
tions. 180 Tipping the scale in favor of either the protective function or the
notice function "directly affects the incentives, and disincentives, to inno-
vate. ' 18 1 If the protective function is overemphasized through broad appli-
178. Id. at 413 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F.3d
1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
179. See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., No. 01 C 6934, 2004 WL 2260626, at *14
(N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 2004) (finding the third Festo criterion rebutted under the shortcomings of language
theory because it would have been "impossible for the inventors to describe all teacup-countering
helical flows that might result from changing certain variables").
180. See Brief of IEEE, supra note 19, at 10-12; see also Lemley, supra note 5, at 1006 ("It should
be obvious from the foregoing discussion that one cannot avoid patent infringement merely by building
something different than what the patentee has built (or even described). Subsequent developers of
products must be careful to avoid treading on the literal language of the patent claims, whether or not
the patentee envisioned the particular device at issue. Further, subsequent developers must attempt to
guarantee that a jury will not find their product to be insubstantially different from the patent claim
language. Even subsequently developed products that unquestionably improve on the work of the
original inventor may infringe the inventor's patent.").
181. See BriefofIEEE, supra note 19, at II.
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cation of the doctrine of equivalents, "patentees receive exclusivity beyond
the literal language of their patents' claims, but inventors have less notice
of an existing patent's scope."' 182 By sacrificing the notice function in favor
of protecting the patentee, the outer boundaries of the patented invention
blur, thus discouraging third-party inventors from improving upon the pat-
ented technology due to the risk of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Conversely, if prosecution history estoppel is used to severely limit
the use of the doctrine of equivalents, the notice function will be at its
strongest. By applying a strict, literal interpretation of the patent's claims,
the patent will offer little protection to the patentee against "insubstantial
modifications that amount to little more than a fraud on the patent."' 183
While inventors holding patentable inventions may have some peace of
mind that modestly modified devices will not infringe, the incentive to
invest in pioneering inventions is greatly diminished, due to "would-be
inventors' concerns that their rights will be immediately diluted in the mar-
ketplace by competitors who have made, at best, insubstantial changes and,
at worst, mere copies.' 1 84
The two previous methods of addressing prosecution history estop-
pel-the flexible bar and the complete bar-represent these two extremes.
On the one hand, the flexible bar rule sacrifices the public notice function
of the patent laws and thus, inhibits innovation by making it impossible for
would-be inventors to know ex ante what the patentee might claim as an
equivalent. On the other hand, the complete bar rule sacrifices the protec-
tive function by prohibiting patentees from using the doctrine of equiva-
lents to claim potentially infringing insubstantial substitutes once they have
amended their claims.
Thus, only a careful balance of the notice and protective functions will
optimally encourage invention and innovation. The third "some other rea-
son" criterion laid out by the Supreme Court in Festo VIII seriously skews
this balance in favor of protecting patentees. In fact, by allowing a patentee
to argue that some other reason prevented it from adequately describing the
equivalent in question, the Court essentially restored the flexible bar rule.
As the Court gave no guidance as to what this "some other reason" could
be, courts will again be required to make a case-by-case analysis every time
a patentee attempts to rebut the Festo presumption under the third criterion.
This severely sacrifices the notice function by making it almost impossible
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 11-12.
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for a would-be inventor, attempting to design around the patented inven-
tion, to determine ex ante this "other reason." In order to realign the bal-
ance of the notice and protective functions, the third "some other reason"
criterion of the Festo presumption must be narrowed in scope.
As discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that the Court in Festo
VIII adopted the "some other reason" criterion to take into account the
main reason that the doctrine of equivalents exists: language is ambiguous
and it is not very easy to describe novel technology. Furthermore, the only
inkling we get from the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit as to what
could possibly count as "some other reason" comes from both courts'
heavy reliance on the shortcomings of language as one of the main policy
reasons for upholding the doctrine. Lastly, looking to the cases which apply
the third criterion, the only plaintiffs that were successful in rebutting the
Festo presumption at the district court level were those who claimed the
shortcomings of language as the reason they could not have described the
equivalent in question. For these reasons, limiting the third criterion to
situations in which some shortcoming of language prevented the patentee
from claiming the asserted equivalent is the most logical choice.
Conversely, some scholars in this area argue that the Festo presump-
tion is a complete bar by another name. 185 It has already proved to be diffi-
cult for patentees to rebut the Festo presumption, so by narrowing the third
criterion even further, it will be even harder for patentees to utilize the doc-
trine of equivalents to protect their proprietary interests. 186 However, it is
arguable that because the third criterion as it stands is so vague, patent
practitioners and patentees have been too confused to even utilize it. Be-
sides the mere suggestion given by the Federal Circuit to use the ambiguity
of language to rebut the presumption under the third criterion, patent practi-
tioners have little to draw on in determining what "other reason[s]" will
rebut the Festo presumption. It is also arguable that if the Supreme Court
were to limit the criterion to the shortcomings of language, practitioners
would be more likely to argue under this criterion if they were given clear
guidelines of what it takes to do so. This criterion's utility will only in-
185. The Supreme Court in Festo VIII did not think that it was creating such a harsh standard. Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002) ("This pre-
sumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name. Rather, it reflects the fact that the interpre-
tation of the patent must begin with its literal claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to
construing those claims."). But see Mark D. Sharp, Festo X: The Complete Bar by Another Name?, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 111 (2004).
186. The Federal Circuit has only found the Festo presumption rebutted once in Insituform Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004), via the tangential relation
criterion.
1686 [Vol 82:3
THE AFTERMATH OF FESTO V. SMC
crease if it is made less vague and more understandable for patent practi-
tioners.
Along the same lines, it is also not hard to believe that judges will be
more receptive to an argument that strikes to the core of the policy behind
the doctrine of equivalents. Since the doctrine is founded on the idea that
when inventors patent their new creation, words may not exist to ade-
quately describe such novel technology, it is logical to believe, as the Fed-
eral Circuit in Festo IX may have, that this may be the most successful way
to rebut the third criterion. As the court stated in Autogiro, "[t]he dictionary
does not always keep abreast of the inventor,"'1 87 and judges might be more
willing to allow a patentee to assert infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents for this reason.
Overall, tying the use of the third criterion to the ambiguity of lan-
guage would foster both the notice and protective functions of the patent.
By making the third criterion more accessible to patent practitioners and
more attainable in the eyes of the law, it provides further protection to pat-
entees. On the other hand, this limitation would make the use of the doc-
trine of equivalents more predictable ex ante. Rather than with the broad,
"some other reason" criterion, competitors will be able to better predict
what might count as an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis directs that the third rebuttal criterion should
be restricted to situations where the ambiguity of language prevented the
patentee from claiming the equivalent in question. While the Federal Cir-
cuit directed that one way a patentee may rebut the Festo presumption un-
der the third criterion is by arguing that the shortcomings of language
prevented the patentee from adequately describing the equivalent in ques-
tion, this Note argues that this should be the only way. The groundwork for
this assertion comes from the Supreme Court's Festo VIII decision itself.
While the Court's explanation is sparse, it supports the idea that one of the
main underpinnings of the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees
from copyists using the ambiguity of language to circumvent the literal
scope of a patent. This assertion is also supported by the policy concerns
surrounding the very vague and broad third rebuttal criterion, which direct
that innovation will suffer greatly if the interests of the patentee and the
public are not brought back into balance.
187. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. CI. 1967).
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